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Abstract 
 
The US state of Rhode Island (RI) offers a unique 
case for examining the conditions that hinder or 
facilitate coastal resilience efforts, due to its small size, 
active coastal program, and dynamic engagement of 
stakeholders. A five-decade corpus of information on 
hazard events, studies, plans and policies, and a 
database of more than 40,000 RI Coastal Resource 
Management Council (CRMC) permit decisions helps 
reveal patterns of decision-making related to coastal 
resilience. A social network map traces RI stakeholder 
engagement revealing hidden areas of resistance to 
resilience policies. Content analysis of documents and 
press coverage of decision-making in just one critical 
coastal area reveals 71 types of obstacles articulated by 
property owners and authorities. Current RI plans and 
studies are biased toward public engagement, filling 
information gaps, and designing new adaptation 
options. Deeper structural, financial and institutional 
sources of resistance to resilience remain and continue 
to be difficult to address. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The current environment surrounding coastal 
hazards decision making is more complex and presents 
more ambiguity than at any time in our recent history. 
Politically, there are more players fighting for the ability 
to develop fewer coastal properties with ever increasing 
regulation on their use. Climatic changes are projected 
to impact coasts and coastal societies considerably, in 
new ways that have not been experienced by human 
societies, presenting an additional layer of complexity 
for decision and policy makers, coastal businesses, and 
coastal property owners. When faced with uncertain 
options, holding on to the status quo as long as possible 
is seen as the most viable path forward. Fortunately, 
there are numerous places and moments in the US where 
the agenda setting process for natural hazards issues 
leads to the adoption and implementation of forward 
looking policies. We explore the nearly five decades of 
experience in the State of Rhode Island to help identify 
and understand the enabling conditions that have 
resulted in past and recent important advances in coastal 
hazards.  
Historically, coastal development design and 
construction requirements are focused on preventing 
loss of life and ignore the possible range of building 
damage states after a disaster and measures of post-
disaster usability. Little action is taken to rehabilitate 
older structures that are often the most vulnerable to 
damage [1] 
Coastal states such as Rhode Island are considering 
a wide range of possible protective actions, however we 
have a limited understanding of how to quantify the 
willingness and ability of communities to adopt these 
new behaviors in order to adapt to storm hazards. We 
continue to struggle to improve the adoption rate of 
protective actions by communities. [2, 3, 4]   
Decisions to carry out mitigation actions are 
complicated, and can depend on a variety of factors 
involving individuals or policies. Mundorf et alia note 
from a psychological perspective that  
“Helping individuals to continue to progress is likely 
to continue to increase their support for disaster and 
adaptation-related public policies as well. We have 
the tools to communicate change, but it takes a 
network of change agents and readiness at all levels 
to design and disseminate effective messages.” [5]  
This contributes to an “adaptation deficit” [6] 
whereby threatened communities and other institutional 
actors often fail to take an appropriate level of actions to 
adapt to climate change threats, including sea level rise 
and coastal storm hazards.  
Low levels of institutional resilience---“the degree 
to which these networks plan for, learn from, and 
operate to address threats, build capacity, and act 
through coordinative vehicles like planning” ---is a 
serious barrier set up by the greater difficulty in 
assembling the resources needed to “infuse targeted 
assistance to communities and associated stakeholders 
beforehand in anticipation of recovery benefits that 
remain unmeasured.” [7]. 
Our research goal is to understand the obstacles, 
incentives, and changing perspectives on adaptation to 
coastal hazards by property owners and within coastal 
areas, focusing on their interactions with public policy 
debates regarding coastal resilience. The order-of-
magnitude improvements neded to improve 
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 preparedness for coastal hazards requires a deeper 
understanding of these challenges. A post-Hurricane 
Sandy analysis by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
noted that: “…the authors of this report are unaware of 
any literature that attempts to quantify the ability of a 
community to transform and adapt new functions in 
response to a disturbance.” [2]. Our project aimed to 
help fill this identified research gap, building on the 
barriers to adaptation research by Moser and Ekstrom 
[8], Deegan et alia, [9]. Mileti [10] and Birkland [11].   
We hypothesize the following to be among the 
important barriers to adoption of appropriate mitigating 
behaviors: 1) decision-makers lack full understanding of 
the threats faced; 2) conflicting incentive structures 
create counterproductive behaviors or otherwise impede 
coordination among groups; 3) established patterns of 
behavior are difficult to overcome; and 4) governance 
systems can hamper adoption of policies to improve 
resilience.  
The coastal state of Rhode Island has one of the 
earliest coastal management laws in the US (1971) and 
earliest federally approved programs (1979). This 
provides more than five decades of planning and 
regulatory experience to draw upon in analyzing factors 
that contribute to or impede progress. 
  
2. The pursuit of coastal resilience policy in 
Rhode Island  
 
The problem, policy and politics streams 
surrounding natural hazard impacts and mitigation are 
intertwined over time. Burby [12] identifies Rhode 
Island as only one of ten states with “both state local 
government building code and comprehensive plan 
requirements”, thus having among the stronger 
governance settings for achieving more resilient 
communities and economy. URI researchers and 
extension staff have worked with citizens, businesses, 
municipal, state, and federal actors for the past half-
century, trying to overcome resistance and obstacles to 
reducing vulnerability to hazards. Such robust planning 
and advisory capability itself may not lead to policies 
that contribute to overall resilience. Contradictions 
abound in attitudes and policy. A case study of 
Washington, North Carolina, by Berke et alia [13] 
found that the city’s hazards plan made a positive 
contribution by seeking to reduce development in the 
100 year flood plain, but didn’t incorporate sea level 
rise. The city’s community development plans were in 
fact aimed at increasing the amount of physical 
development in hazardous areas not restricting it. 
The Hurricane of 1938 remains the most referred to 
storm event for Rhode Island. It is the subject of periodic 
retrospectives in the press and the largest flooding 
footprint throughout the state from a historical storm. 
More recently, Hurricane Carol in 1954 led to the 1957 
“Hurricane Survey Interim Report” by the US Army 
Corps of Engineers. The Corps proposed a variety of 
hurricane barrier configurations for Narragansett Bay. 
This plan in turn led to the construction of the Fox Point 
Barrier in 1960-1966, very close to the City of 
Providence in the headwaters of the Bay and the 
rejection of other proposals that would have cut off the 
entire bay from the Atlantic Ocean. 
Natural hazards policies in RI date to the creation of 
the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968, the 
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council 
in 1971, the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 
1972, the John Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 
1982, and numerous modifications and reauthorizations 
since then. FEMA’s Project Impact and its successors 
since 1997 spurred the creation of local multi-hazard 
mitigation plans. URI researchers and extension staff 
have been active at least since the 1970s in documenting 
coastal processes and storm damage. Natural hazards 
were also a focus of the original RI Coastal Management 
Program document in 1979 and the Salt Ponds Special 
Area Management Plan adopted in 1984. 
A major concern for planners and researchers 
concerned about resilience in Rhode Island is the 
absence of recent memory of a major disaster that 
affected the entire state and galvanized a major response 
similar to Hurricane Carol in 1954. Becker [14] found 
the absence of memory to be a major reason for the 
effectiveness of recently developed highly detailed 
computer simulations such as “Hurricane Rhody”, 
which he used to facilitate scenario planning in the Port 
of Providence, Rhode Island. “The problem of hurricane 
and sea level rise risk for the port of Providence, in 
itself, is very difficult to define and bound. Providence 
has experience numerous major hurricanes (e.g., 1817, 
1885, 1938, and 1954), there has not been such an event 
in recent memory. None of the participants witnessed 
such a major storm hit the area, though many could 
recall hurricanes with far less power.” [14] 
We identified 148 coastal storm events affecting 
Rhode Island since 1936 including floods, winter storms 
and hurricanes that likely generated localized coastal 
storm damage leading to private and public investments 
in physical shore protection. These storms generate 
pockets of continuing damage on top of chronic coastal 
erosion along the state’s highly varied 420 mile coast, 
making it necessary for coastal managers to focus on 
highly localized problem solving and regulatory 
solutions.  
Our own organization, the Coastal Resources Center 
(CRC) based at the Graduate School of Oceanography 
of the University of Rhode Island has been involved 
throughout its history.  Subsequently Project Impact in 
the late 1990s led to CRC involvement in preparing 
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 municipal hazard mitigation plans for the municipalities 
of Pawtucket and Narragansett. 
In summary, Rhode Island’s experience with coastal 
flooding, storms and chronic erosion over the past 
eighty years led to substantial institutional reforms of 
the type currently recommended by leading experts. 
Some have involved large scale construction (the 
hurricane barrier protecting the City of Providence) and 
many others requiring site specific shore protection 
installations and solutions, with increasing preference 
given to non-structural approaches. Rhode Island has 
depended heavily on scientific studies monitoring and 
projecting shoreline change rates and more recently on 
sophisticated online services such as STORMTOOLS 
(http://www.beachsamp.org/stormtools/) that simulate 
likely damage to individual property owner, current and 
future risk due to coastal hazards, major hurricanes 
through the Hurricane Rhody simulation and dramatic 
sea level rise predictions. 
In the following sections we examine the lived RI 
experience in three ways: looking for patterns in more 
than four decades of coastal development decisions 
(Section 3.1); mapping and exploring the expanding 
policy network for climate and hazard resilience 
(Section 3.2); and examining in close detail the content 
of resilience and hazard plans, studies, decisions and 
debates to reveal how stakeholders describe obstacles 
and barriers to attaining more resilient coastal 
development (Section 3.3).  
 
3. Documenting coastal resilience policy 
implementation  
 
3.1 Insights from the coastal development 
permit data base: new versus intensifying uses 
 
The RI CRMC has prepared an evolving series of 
studies, policies, and regulations as part of its record of 
more than 40,000 permit decisions on development 
activities in Rhode Island’s coastal zone. For this 
research, the full CRMC permit data base from 1971 to 
2016 is compiled and analyzed for the first time to 
identify patterns of decision making during post-storm 
event recovery as well as implementation of hazard 
reduction policies found in both statewide regulations 
and special area plans. The searchable permit data 
system is online at 
http://www.crmcpermitdatabase.org/pads.  
One particular area of concern for coastal resilience 
in Rhode Island are its commercial waterfronts. 
Providence Harbor, Newport Harbor and Wickford 
Cove, important commercial and recreation ports, have 
been the focus of numerous vulnerability studies and 
adaptation planning since the beginning of the 2000s.  
There are ten types of permit decisions issued by the 
CRMC and its regulatory staff. Six of these lead to 
actual construction projects including administrative or 
routine projects that easily conform to CRMC standards, 
more complex projects which are reviewed and 
approved by full CRMC; applications for maintaining 
an existing structure; fresh water wetlands permits; 
projects related to ice damage, and a special set of 
permits issued to allow rapid repairs to storm damage 
from Hurricane Sandy in 2012.  
The CRMC has placed a great deal of emphasis in 
recent years on providing early guidance and advice to 
applicants for coastal development. However, in the 
following analyses, only permits issued for actual 
development projects are included in order to reflect 
actual decisions and construction. This includes 28,203 
permit decisions that relate to projects that are 
implemented. 
Figure 1 Annual comparison of CRMC assents 
that allow NEW USES on a coastal site (red line) 
compared to projects that maintain or rehabilitate 
(REHAB) existing development on coastal sites 
(blue line). Does not include preliminary 
determinations nor findings of no impact. 
 
In addition to administrative categories the CRMC 
tracks permits by development activity type. There are 
92 of these. In the 1980s new housing development 
dominated the attention of regulators. From a peak of 
144 new units per year in the 1980s, the CRMC only 
approved 41 new homes on the coast in 2016.  In recent 
decades the majority of CRMC housing decisions 
involve the rehabilitation or maintenance of existing 
buildings. An index to track these two trends is shown 
in Figure 1. The “REHABs existing use” trendline is 
composed of 15 permit activity types that involve 
rehabilitating or rebuilding coastal structures. The 
”NEW USES on sites” trend-line combines 17 activity 
types that involve new construction and coastal 
modification.  
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 NEW USES of the coast include new houses with 
onsite septic systems, new houses connected to sewers 
and houses with substantial alterations.  
Quite simply, there are very few new development 
projects upon which to apply the increasingly 
progressive and protective policies and regulations in 
the Rhode Island coastal management program. In stark 
contrast, applications for REHAB projects that upgrade 
existing properties increased dramatically in the mid-
2000s and now dominate the CRMC’s decision making 
workload. This growing intensification of the use of 
existing structures and property within already-
developed coastal areas suggests that existing property 
owners, as well as prospective purchasers of existing 
shorefront homes are not retreating from the shore. The 
REHABilitation type projects in coastal sites are not 
subject to the most stringent regulations for elevation 
above base flood elevation as long as the proposed 
modifications to structures are less than 50 per cent.  
 
3.2 Shore protection and management 
decisions: geographic distribution of decisions. 
 
There are four development activity types directly 
related to shoreline erosion, sea level rise and flooding 
from storms. Between 1971 and 2016, the CRMC issued 
2,882 permits in these categories, as shown in Table 1.  
We georeferenced the entire CRMC permit data base 
using ArcGIS 10.1 with the aid of the ArcGIS Maps 
add-in for Excel.  
 
Table 1 Shore protection decisions 1971 to 2016 
(Total = 2,882) 
 
An index using the four shore management and 
protection decisions was mapped this using the cluster 
analysis routine available through ArcGIS online.  The 
result is shown in in Figure 2. 
Each of these clusters of intense, continuous 
decision-making along the Rhode Island south shore 
have unique geomorphology, coastal development 
characteristics and patterns of exposure to erosion, 
waves, wind and storms. Ironically, forecasts of future 
damage to coastal property in high hazard areas suggest 
that current policies may actually prompt property 
owners to make minimal repairs and reinforce their  
 
Figure 2 Location of clusters of shore protection 
permits on RI’s south shore, highlighting 
Matunuck Village. 
 
desire to stay in hazardous shore areas. Small et alia [15] 
used a Coastal Environmental Risk Index (CERI) to 
analyze Matunuck Village (Figure 2), located adjacent 
to local and state operated public beaches. In recent 
years the village has become a hot spot for contentious 
shore protection decisions. (See Section 6).  Small and 
his colleagues estimated damage to the 708 existing 
structures simulating a 100 year storm event with and 
without predicted sea level rise [15].  They found that 
“approximately 35% of the one and two story 
structures…are expected to be damaged from a 100 year 
storm event with no sea level rise…However, only 12% 
of these structures are estimated to be damaged more 
than 50%.” Since 50% damage represents a critical 
threshold, very few property owners would have to 
rebuild to stringent standards. A significant degree of 
resistance to adopting resilience in coastal development 
is baked into the nature of coastal development patterns 
and existing policy affecting the state’s 420 miles of 
coastline.  
 
3.3 Shore protection and management 
decisions: trends over time. 
 
In the 1970s more than half of the projects approved 
by the CRMC were for new hard shoreline protection 
facilities. With the adoption of the revised “Red Book” 
regulatory program document in 1983 beach 
nourishment and conservation became far more 
important. Since 2010 only 30 hardened shoreline 
projects have been approved. Repair to existing shore 
protection structures, 365 since 2010, continues to be 
allowed and accounts for about 40% of the total of 
current CRMC decisions. Non-structural shoreline 
protection is being tested but remains a very small 
portion of applications to the CRMC. There have been 
just 23 such projects since 2010.  
Figure 3 shows the steady decline in approved 
applications for new houses in the high hazard defined 
here as the overwash zone of the Hurricane of 1938.  
Shoreline Protection Facilities/Repair 1556 
Beach Nourishment/ Conservation 
Restoration 767 
Shoreline Protection Facilities/New 504 
Shoreline Protection (Non-Structural) 55 
Matunuck 
Village  
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 Figure 3 Declining trends in CRMC assents 
issued for new or altered dwellings in the high 
hazard zone as defined by the overwash area of 
the Hurricane of 1938. 
 
In 2016 the CRMC approved only 4 new dwellings 
connected to municipal sewer service, 14 using onsite 
waste disposal, and 48 structures undergoing major 
alterations in the high hazard zone as defined by the 
Hurricane of 1938 overwash zone. This is a tiny 
proportion of the 4,991 dwellings and shore protection 
projects already approved in the hazardous overwash 
zone, and 13,952 structures presently located there. 
Figure 4 shows a segment of the Matunuck coastline 
illustrating structures now located in the high hazard 
zone (green shading) and the CRMC permits issued for 
new houses as well as shore protection projects within 
that zone. 
 
4. Recent coastal resilience policy and 
planning: opportunities for progress. 
 
Two years after Hurricane Sandy generated 
substantial damage to the South Shore and segments of 
Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island initiated several major 
studies, plans, data and tools including: the Rhode 
Island Hazard Mitigation Plan 2014 Update [16]; the 
inauguration of the RI Shoreline Change Special Area 
Management Plan [4]; the initiation of work on 
STORMTOOLS [17]; and the establishment of the 
Rhode Island Climate Change Coordinating Council. 
Post-Hurricane Sandy funding along with resources 
from Rhode Island Sea Grant and Rhode Island state 
agencies has helped support these efforts. This period 
also represents a transition in approaches to public 
engagement. The 2014 Update to the Hazard Mitigation 
Plan led by the RI Emergency Management Agency 
Figure 4 Matunuck Village structures within high 
hazard zone (overwash from Hurricane of 1938)   
Notes: Coastal development since 1971 is largely 
within the zone of impact of the storm surge from the 
Hurricane of 1938 (yellow). Shore protection actions 
were sought by 120 individuals and businesses who 
carried out 211 projects (pink circle ) in the village 
area. Many new and altered dwellings have been 
permitted within the Hurricane overwash zone by the 
CRMC, within its narrow 200 foot primary jurisdiction 
(blue stars  and, green ). 
 
(RIEMA) received written comments from only 13 
individuals, mainly representing government agencies. 
RIEMA relied upon an online survey questionnaire that 
yielded only 70 responses, also principally from 
government officials. [16, p. 22].   
In sharp contrast, the 2018 RI Shoreline Change 
Special Area Management Plan (Beach SAMP) [4] led 
by the CRMC engaged upwards of 1000 individuals in 
more than 30 public events, as well as made active use 
of an interactive website to keep the public informed 
about the years-long planning process 
(http://www.beachsamp.org/). Participants included 
property owners as well as those representing 
organizations, businesses, and neighborhood 
associations, as well as educational institutions, 
professional associations and other groups not captured 
in the Update. This intensely process-oriented approach 
has been a characteristic of Rhode Island coastal 
management since its inception, but also strongly 
supported by the work of Moser and Ekstrom analyzing 
lessons from San Francisco Bay experience. [18]. Yet 
there may be a participation divide acting as a barrier to 
adaptation. We explore this in Section 5. 
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Figure 5 Social network analysis showing stratification and weak ties between the state level climate 
change and hazards actors (upper tier), stakeholders engaged in the RI Shoreline Change Special Area 
Management Plan (middle tier) and CRMC permit recipients for shore protection and new coastal 
dwellings state-wide (lower clusters) 
Notes: The red dots in the sociogram represent individuals, while colored squares identify the meetings, reports, 
events and types of permits that individuals are affiliated with. 
 
5. The participation divide: a structural 
obstacle to stakeholder engagement and 
adoption of policy innovations   
 
Is Rhode Island’s high level of public engagement 
actually reaching and influencing all those who are 
actually facing difficult current and future decisions 
regarding their homes and businesses located in high 
hazard areas?  
We identified individuals involved in recent public 
events primarily in the present decade related to 
natural hazards and climate change, including publicly 
posted meeting minutes, reports, plans and other 
publications, attendance lists at Beach SAMP and 
other public meetings and workshops as well as the 
individuals holding coastal permits for shore 
protection and new homes.  
The method of social network analysis we used to 
represent relationships is referred to as affiliation 
network or two-mode analysis. [19] It is based on the 
idea that individuals who meet or are involved in an 
‘event’, such as a meeting, project, document, online 
meeting, and so on, have some kind of relationship. 
We combined this information with data from 
documents, news coverage and coastal development 
permit applicants statewide. The resulting socio-gram 
shown in Figure 5 includes 3833 individuals tied 
together by 57 events, 88 organizations as well as 4562 
shore management and dwelling permits. (Individuals 
often are tied to multiple permit decisions.) 
One surprise in this analysis is the apparent divide, 
between the individuals identified who are engaged in 
policy and planning activities on a regular basis; those 
who participated in the 2018 Beach SAMP; and those 
are actually living along the shore and hold permits. 
Actors engaged in ongoing resilience policy 
debates as identified through documents, event 
participation and responsible organizations, form the 
top layer of the network. The Beach SAMP process 
included a series of 30 events held around the state 
from 2015 to 2018, engaged many of those already 
involved brought in hundreds of new people as well. 
However, very few of the individuals holding permits 
for shore protection or new development could be 
determined to have participated in the Beach SAMP 
process or otherwise engaged in meetings related to 
coastal and natural hazards resilience by other state 
and municipal entities. For example, only nine 
individuals, businesses and organizations with 
shoreline protection type permits from the CRMC in 
the hotly debated Matunuck situation are mentioned in 
the decades of news coverage of how the village is 
coping with coastal hazards. None of these local 
_Beach_SAMP_meetings
_docs
_orgs
_other_ev
A_Beach Nourishment Conservation Restorati
A_NewDwellingISDSA_NewDwellingSewer
A_Shoreline Protection (Non-Structural)
A_Shoreline Protection Facilities New
A_Shoreline Protection Facilities Repair
Participants in state climate and hazards meetings, organizations and documents 
Participants the RI Shoreline Change Special Area Management Plan 
 
Coastal development permit holders 
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 entities and actors appeared to be at all engaged in 
state-level policy and planning efforts.  
One important group acting as a link between 
planning efforts and actual experience with shore 
protection and coastal development are coastal 
municipal governments. Cities and towns are 
struggling to determine how to maintain public 
infrastructure and recreational facilities in the face of 
sea level rise, erosion and a future major hurricane 
disaster, along with balancing conflicting priorities of 
maintaining public safety and promoting coastal 
development and maintaining an adequate tax base. 
Another key group is largely hidden in this 
analysis: the dozens of builders, financers, legal, 
architectural and engineering consultants who 
frequently attend planning meetings and act in the 
background as key intermediaries between regulators, 
planners and property owners. More needs to done to 
understand the views and roles played by this group. 
 
6. A Century of coastal change and conflict 
in Matunuck Beach: an approach to 
understanding stakeholder views on 
resilience. 
 
Matunuck has been the locus of coastal 
management challenges and controversies since the 
1970s, but more importantly has been a unique 
community and summer colony since the mid-1800s. 
The 2015 Matunuck Village Plan Prepared by Horsley 
Witten Group [20] sets out a detailed portrayal of its 
enduring value as a place for recreation, vacation 
homes and permanent residences. The social and 
recreational aspects of Matunuck are usually the focus 
for the seaside village, but the natural features that 
shape the landscape and provide habitat are also 
integral to the experience of Matunuck. Most recently, 
larger forces have become the center of attention as 
ocean currents and storms are reshaping Matunuck in 
dramatic ways. [20, p. 6].  
According to the recently completed Shoreline 
Change Special Area Management Plan (SAMP) 
adopted by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources 
Management Council, the Matunuck Headland area is 
one of the most at risk in the state to the combined 
effects of storm surge, sea level rise and coastal 
erosion. An evaluation of historic shoreline change 
revealed a very high rate of erosion along a stretch of 
Matunuck from Cards Pond to the east end of South 
Kingstown Town Beach, with losses up to 1.4 
meters/year. [4, Chapter 4, p. 52]  
We compiled several dozen reports, plans and 
published studies, along with several hundred 
newspaper articles from 1983 to 2017 obtained using 
the simple search string “Matunuck AND erosion OR 
flooding”. In addition, the full text of the Providence 
Journal and other Rhode Island based newspapers was 
searched and relevant articles downloaded.   
We then used content analysis software, AtlasTi, 
to explore how all those who have written about or 
whose concerns and views have been documented 
view and express in their own terms the opportunities 
and obstacles carry out the content analysis.   
An initial vocabulary of key terms and concepts 
was augmented by free coding as items were reviewed. 
This effort yielded 71 codes for quotes related to 
obstacles to adaptation, an equal number of codes 
covering adaptation responses, and 29 distinct codes 
for opportunities to adapt. Frequently mentioned 
obstacles, opportunities and action responses can be 
summarized as follows, in decreasing frequency of 
occurrence: 
OBSTACLES 
 Mismatch between impact causes and 
availability of effective solutions. 
 Low comprehension of risk by property owners. 
 Intense interest in extending the use of property 
in hazardous areas as long as possible. 
 Strength of efforts to protect property and 
business investments. 
 High cost of more effective solutions. 
 Safety fears prompting urgent demands for quick 
action. 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 Ongoing state/ federal planning, zoning, 
regulation process. 
 Public meeting or hearing. 
 Coordination & capacity for funding. 
 Collaboration between private and government 
stakeholders. 
 Congruence between nature of problem and most 
effective solutions. 
 Educate private and public sector stakeholders. 
RESILIENCE RESPONSES: 
 Shoreline protection (sea wall, sheet pile). 
 Relocation of structures or activities. 
 Proposed hazard policies and regulations. 
 Temporary sand bags, fencing, wooden walls, 
burritos (fabric tubes). 
 Beach nourishment (with material trucked in 
from outside). 
 Beach nourishment related to local channel 
dredging projects. 
Researchers, planners, regulators and stakeholders 
do not speak in “obstacles and opportunities” 
language. Our free coding rarely used actual phrases 
from stakeholders. For example, at a public hearing in 
April 2011, state and local officials met with a 
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 “roomful of disgruntled residents” to address the 
burgeoning conflicts over the degree of shore 
protection that should be allowed in a short section of 
Matunuck Beach road. [21] 
The director of the State Coastal Resources 
Management Council stated that: 
“…if he gives Matunuck what it wants, what 
does he say to other owners of shoreline 
properties who  want to build sea walls? Hardened 
structures block the flow of sand and often cause 
more erosion of adjoining beaches.” 
“Kevin Finnegan of the Ocean Mist said much 
of the shoreline from Town Beach to East 
Matunuck State Beach is already hardened. The 
state should just finish the job, he said, or let 
property owners do it. 
“Let me, Fran and the other property owners 
protect your road, said Finnegan, to big applause.”  
“South Kingstown manager Stephen Alfred 
said “only 65 feet of land remain between the 
ocean and Matunuck Beach Road.  To me, we’ve 
got to look at how to protect the village and 
existing businesses. The longer we say we don t 
know how we’re going to do it, the options 
become less and less. I haven’t heard of other 
areas in Rhode Island where businesses are about 
to fall into the drink. “ 
“Fran O’Brien of Tara’s Joyce Family Pub said 
he wasn’t asking for taxpayer help, he just wanted 
permission to protect his own property.”   
In coding these passages from the article we found 
at least eight distinct obstacles facing the decision-
making conflict in Matunuck:   
 need to demonstrate a public purpose for a hazard 
mitigation project.  
 need for equitable resolution of conflicts.  
 interest in extending the use of property in 
hazardous areas as long as possible.  
 political pressure on decision makers. 
 interest in protecting property, businesses and 
investments.  
 safety fears leading to calls for quick action. 
 limited availability of relocation sites.  
 pressure to relax protective rules. 
Although Matunuck stakeholders---including a 
town official---expressed the view that they are 
uniquely singled out for push-back from state 
authorities, no one is clamoring for more scientific 
information about whether there is a problem, rather 
the focus is on the decision time-horizon and the 
willingness by property owners to accept short to 
medium range actions.   
There are many more connections and dynamics 
among the obstacles, opportunities and responses, but 
our aim here is to show broader ideas and patterns. The 
full set of obstacles, opportunities and responses can 
be arrayed around six broad categories: Process, 
Knowledge & Attitudes, Situational Factors, Money & 
Finance, Actions and Policy. The specific quotes 
captured for Matunuck cover the full range of drama, 
frustration and doubt raised each time a major storm 
event causes damage and concern in the community. 
In contrast, most public documents such as plans and 
studies shy away from a discussion of obstacles and 
focus on Knowledge, Action, and Process variables. 
The Shoreline Special Area Plan document is rich and 
thorough in its scientific treatment of Matunuck and 
other high priority segments of the shore, as well as 
detailed in its recommendations on adaptation actions. 
Yet the new plan is also constrained in its approach: 
“The guidance offered by this Shoreline Change 
SAMP is primarily for applicants seeking coastal 
permits from CRMC. CRMC is proposing a 
requirement that coastal permit applicants complete 
a five-step risk assessment process for proposed 
developments within CRMC’s jurisdiction as part of 
the permit application. [4]  
The audience for the new SAMP includes decision 
makers, planners, boards and commissions in Rhode 
Island’s 21 coastal communities who are principally 
responsible for coping with the impacts of storms, 
coastal erosion, and sea level rise outside of CRMC’s 
jurisdiction. The SAMP is also intended to aid other 
state and federal agencies responsible for coastal 
resources, assets and property in Rhode Island in 
future planning and decision making. [4] 
However, the continuing depth of conflict and 
resistance to some of Rhode Island’s resilience 
measures produced a surprising policy result in mid-
2018 after the Beach SAMP was adopted. The RI 
General Assembly sided with environmentalists, the 
CRMC and builders---against staunch opposition of 
municipalities---to allow developers to measure 
maximum building height from the base flood 
elevation rather than ground level, creating much 
higher structures that will be resilient to flooding and 
storm surge but also leading to “plenty of uproar when 
building permits are pulled and neighbors see the size 
of beachfront homes to be built.” [22] Even if current 
trends show a relatively low rate of new shorefront 
development within the Hurricane of ’38 overwash 
zone, this policy could offer a strong incentive for 
wealthy property owners to acquire and demolish even 
more vulnerable structures and replace them with 
“McMansions” that meet legal requirements but block 
views, possibly lower property values in surrounding 
shore-side neighborhoods and increase the number of 
structures overall that are exposed to hazards.  
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 7. Summary 
Numerous obstacles, opportunities and responses 
to climate and hazard resilience are present in Rhode 
Island, a coastal state without recent experience in 
responding to the type of major disaster represented by 
Hurricane Katrina, Matthew, Harvey, Maria, 
Matthew, Sandy and Florence. Rhode Island 
researchers and planners remain concerned about 
raising the level of public understanding of the 
combined effects of a historic level hurricane 
combined sea level rise and chronic coastal erosion as 
threats to coastal development and ecosystems. They 
are producing new information and approaches to 
visualization and conducting active stakeholder 
engagement and planning processes to create better 
policy and motivate coastal property owner and 
community response. 
We employed three approaches to understand 
obstacles to and opportunities for resilience actions 
beyond the standard concerns about lack of knowledge 
and low comprehension of risk.  
Our examination of coastal regulatory decisions 
indicates that there are dozens of segments or reaches 
of the RI coast where homeowners and businesses 
continue to struggle to maintain their properties in the 
face of localized threats from periodic storms, chronic 
erosion and rising sea level. Matunuck Beach is one of 
the most contentious of these locations and became a 
focus of our attention. The steady decline in requests 
for new housing construction or hardened shoreline 
protection on the shore has been replaced by property 
owners remodeling or rehabilitating older properties to 
extend their usable life in the face of hazards. Now 
they have the added incentive of being able to raise 
these old structures above flood elevation without 
violating local zoning ordinances. Neither education, 
online mapping tools, frightening scenarios nor the 
potential of loss of access to flood insurance may not 
deter this group from causing a surge in coastal 
development.  
Our assembly of social network data confirms 
that Rhode Island’s recent effort to create a new set of 
guidelines for vulnerable areas, the Beach SAMP, 
succeeded in expanding stakeholder awareness and 
engagement in resilience planning, particularly among 
municipal authorities. However, state planning efforts 
are not reaching the far greater number of individuals 
and businesses already located in the shore, possessing 
shore protection permits and continuing to facing 
chronic property damage. The efforts may not be 
reaching those who are rehabilitating or seeking to 
construct new homes in the most vulnerable areas.  
Hidden from view in the present analysis are the 
highly influential group of builders, financers and 
consultants who work with property owners to 
navigate the evolving universe of information, plans, 
regulations and characteristics of hazardous coastal 
sites to meet their clients’ expectations. Evidence of 
their broader influence on RI resilience policy 
emerged in the surprise adoption in July 2018 of the 
dramatic change to measuring base elevation of 
properties in coastal areas to allow elevation of coastal 
structures to proceed more rapidly.  
Our analysis of the content of documents and 
press reports on coastal hazards, focusing on the 
continuing conflict in Matunuck Village, indicates that 
the plain language that is used by stakeholders to 
express frustration and even resistance to resilience 
initiatives is not readily captured in any of the 
analytical schemes used by resilience researchers, 
including our own. Coastal property owners and 
public officials facing damage to public infrastructure 
have a broad range of concerns and sometimes 
conflicting goals that lie well beyond the need for 
better understanding that needs to be remedied by yet 
more scientific and site based information or by 
improvements in the planning and stakeholder 
engagement process. Those who are determined to 
protect their shorefront investments argue for an 
unconstrained right to do so while those with ample 
funds and a determination to remain or locate in the 
coast want clear rules to comply with, however 
expensive.  
Coastal residents and business owners who are 
willing to retreat or relocate after a major storm or in 
the face of chronic impacts, are still searching---so far 
in vain---for acceptable, feasible, and affordable 
alternatives while they still have time to act.  
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